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Koster: Extrinsic Evidence in Patent Claim Interpretation: Understanding

EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IN PATENT CLAIM
INTERPRETATION: UNDERSTANDING THE
POST-MARKMAN CONFUSION
I. INTRODUCTION

Patent claim interpretation is often pivotal to the outcome of a patent
infringement suit. Proving infringement requires that the infringing
product' incorporate all the elements of a patent claim. Often, since the
details of the defendant's product are usually readily discernable by
examination of the product itself or through discovery, interpretation of the
claim in question is often dispositive to the determination of infringement.
Frequently, interpretation of a single phrase or individual word in the claim
determines the outcome. The scrutinized words or phrases may be technical
in nature or quite ordinary.2
Patent claim interpretation is discussed at length in the Federal Circuit's
1995 Markman3 decision (Markman 1) that was affirmed by the Supreme
Court in 1996 (Markman II).' These and subsequent Federal Circuit
decisions have discussed the role of extrinsic evidence in patent claim
interpretation, but have left less than clear guidance to the district courts
regarding its usage. Much of the confusion appears to be attributable to the
Federal Circuit's VitronicsCorp.v. Conceptronic,Inc.' ruling, partly from the
ruling itself and partly from misinterpretation by the lower courts. Vitronics
promulgated rules that, if considered in isolation, could be easily read as
dogmatically indicating when extrinsic evidence should and should not be
used. Several cases demonstrate this perspective with negative impacts on
claim interpretation. Fortunately, recent Federal Circuit rulings recognize
this situation and successfully resolve much of the confusion by providing
For brevity, the term "product" is used, although 35 U.S.C. S 101 states that "any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter" may be patented.
2 See, e.g., Fromson v. Anitec Printing Plates, Inc., 132 F.3d 1437, 1443,45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1269,
1272 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (interpreting the meaning of "anodized"); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d
1448, 1459, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169, 1175 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (interpreting the meaning of "to").
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(hereinafter Markman 1].
' Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461 (1996)
[hereinafter Markman i].
5 90 F.3d 1576, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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balanced direction to the lower courts regarding the use of extrinsic evidence.
Furthermore, a recent Supreme Court ruling,6 albeit not a patent case,
affirms the broad latitude of trial judges in considering expert testimony.
These developments are expected to provide more freedom to the district
courts in deciding when to use extrinsic evidence with the result of higher
quality rulings.
IT. BACKGROUND

A patent infringement case involves two elements: "construing the patent
and determining whether infringement occurred ...... The Supreme Court
stated as early as 1853 that "'the first is a question of law, to be determined
by the court.. . . The second is a question of fact, to be submitted to a
jury.' " This division has not been as simple as it appears. The Federal
Circuit initially held that claim construction was a matter of law, but by its
own admission, it inconsistently treated claim interpretation in subsequent
rulings as "a legal or factual issue, or a mixed issue."9 Markman I firmly
declared claim interpretation to be a legal issue within the sole province of
the court.'" The Supreme Court affirmed and purified what it termed a
"mongrel practice"" by stating that "construction of a patent, including
terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the province of the
court" 2 and should not be submitted to the jury. The Court based their
finding on examination of the historical context, various patent treatises, and
its own precedent." In addition, the Court reasoned that judges, given their
special training and practice, are more likely to properly and consistently
interpret claims.
In many cases, though, interpreting technological subtleties of a patent
claim is a daunting task for a district court judge, who is not likely to be

'Kumho Tire Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1177 (1999).
Markman11,
517 U.S. at 384.
Id at 384 (quoting Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 338 (1853)).
Markman 1,52 F.3d at 976-77.
t'In its opinion, the Federal Circuit listed nine Supreme Court cases dearly holding claim
construction was a matter of law.
" Markman II, 517 U.S. at 378.
u Id at372.
13 Markman 11, 517 U.S. at 382; id at 384 n.10.
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versed in technology. The Supreme Court recognized well over 100 years
ago that
judges will [not] always possess the requisite knowledge of
the meaning of the terms of art or science used in letters
patent, [therefore] it often becomes necessary that they
should avail themselves of the light furnished by experts
relevant to the significance of such words and phrases. The
judges are not, however, obliged to blindly follow such
testimony."
Obviously, the sophistication of technology at that time pales in comparison
with the current state of the art, and judges are even more likely to be
overwhelmed. As a result of Markman II, district court judges hold what are
now referred to as "Markman hearings" in which extrinsic evidence is
presented to assist the judge's claim interpretation.
In reality, judges were accomplishing this prior to Markman II by using
the judicial tools of either court appointed experts5 or special masters.16
Trial courts have used such resources to assist in technical matters,
particularly in patent cases"7 for a long time. 8 Some courts, such as the
Northern District of California, home of Silicon Valley and a great deal of
high technology patent litigation, have formalized local court rules specific
to patent litigation, including requiring each party to submit their claim
interpretations, description of infringed elements, and any relevant extrinsic
information. 9

'4

Markman 11, 517 U.S. at 387 (quoting A. WALKER, PATENT LAWS S 189, at 173 (3d ed. 1895)).

"FED. R. EVID. 706.
16 FED.

R. CIV. P. 53.

'7In a survey of 431 active district court judges, 20% indicated that they had employed an expert

witness at least once with patent cases being the second most common application. Joe S. Cecil & Thomas
E. Willging, Court-AppointedExperts, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, 525, 535-36,
540-41 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. Ed., 1994).
" Although use of special masters was formalized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 in 1938, use
of special masters by the courts was made much earlier. See, e.g., Heckers v. Fowler, 69 U.S. 123 (1864)
(citing the use of a "referee" in a patent case).
'9 N.D. CAL. Loc. R. 16-6 to 16-11. See also Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co.,
894 F. Supp. 844, 850, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1069 (D. Del. 1995) (stating three options for when
and how a trial judge may interpret a patent claim).
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A Markman hearing is usually conducted at or near the end of discovery."0
If it has not occurred at this point, parties will often "routinely move for the
early resolution of the claim construction issue either under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 56 or 12(b)(6)"" requiring the judge to address claim
interpretation. If evidence does not support summary judgment of
infringement and a trial is required, the jury acts as fact finder in determining
whether the defendant's product incorporates all the elements of the
construed claim. In practice, interpretation of the claim in question often
allows summary judgement to be entered.22 Consequently, the Markman
hearing often serves as a "mini trial."23
Before examining the use of extrinsic evidence in claim interpretation, it
is necessary to understand how claim interpretation proceeds in conjunction
with intrinsic evidence.
DE. PATENT CLAIM INTERPRETATION
USING INTRINSIC EVIDENCE

Markman I was significant in holding that claim interpretation was a
finding of law. That may have contributed to its lengthy en banc ruling on
April 5, 1995.2" Markman I describes claim interpretation with a balanced
tone and highlights the discretion the court has when considering extrinsic
evidence. For example:
This [extrinsic] evidence may be helpful to explain scientific
principles, the meaning of technical terms, and terms of art
that appear in the patent and prosecution history. Extrinsic
evidence may demonstrate the state of the prior art at the
time of the invention.... The court may, in its discretion,
receive extrinsic evidence in order "to aid the court in

Markman Procedures,INTELL. PROP. L NEWSL. (A.B.A., Chicago, Ill.), Spring 1997, at 34-36.
ElfAtochem N.Am., 894 F. Supp. at 857.
" See Voice Techs. Group, Inc. v. VMC Sys., Inc., 164 F.3d 605, 612, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1333,
1337 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating that claim construction is often determinative in infringement cases).
" See Markman 1,52 F.3d at1008 n.5 (Judge Newman dissenting) (predicting that judges will hold
evidentiary hearings functioning as a mini, or preliminary, trial); ElfAtoc em NorthAmerica, Inc., 894 F.
Supp. at 850 (referring to a two day Markman hearing as a 'Markman Trial").
4 The ruling was approximately 54 pages long.
2
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coming to a correct conclusion" as to the "true meaning of
the language employed" in the patent.2"

Markman I was affirmed by the Supreme Court on April 23, 1996. The
Markman 1I ruling was much shorter and focused on the province of the
court regarding claim interpretation rather than the process of claim
construction. Markman II did touch upon the consideration of extrinsic
evidence and acknowledged the court's discretion in considering extrinsic
evidence.26
Three months later, on July 25, 1996, a Federal Circuit panel comprising
Judges Michel, Lourie, and Friedman released Vitronics Corp. v.
Conceptronic, Inc.27
Vitronics summarized procedures for claim
interpretation, but used language more extreme than perhaps intended. It
stated that "in interpreting an asserted claim, the court should look first to
the intrinsic evidence of record, i.e., the patent itself, including the claims,
the specification and, if in evidence, the prosecution history." 28 The court
actually prioritized consideration of intrinsic evidence in that order and
indicated the claims and specification must
be examined, but consideration
of the prosecution history is optional. 29 The court added that "[i]n most
situations, an analysis of the intrinsic evidence alone will resolve any
ambiguity in a disputed claim term. In such circumstances, it is improperto
rely on extrinsic evidence."0 The impropriety of using extrinsic evidence is
emphasized again by the Court where it stated that "[oinly ifthere were still
some genuine ambiguity in the claims, after consideration of all available
intrinsic evidence, should the trial court have resorted to extrinsic evidence,
such as expert testimony, in order to construe [the claims]." 31 This statement
appears to discourage any use of extrinsic evidence, but a subsequent
sentence recognizes that "[e]xtrinsic evidence may also be considered, if
needed to assist in determining the meaning or scope of technical terms in the
claims."32 However, this statement is followed with a warning that "where

25 Markman 1,52 F.3d at 980 (citation omitted).
26 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
' Vitronics, 90 F.3d 1576.
' d. at 1576.

Id. at 1582.
-' Id. at 1583 (emphasis added).
31 Id. at 1584 (emphasis added).
2 Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583 (quoting Pall Corp. v. Micron Separating, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1216, 36
29
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the public record unambiguously describes the scope of the patented
33
invention, reliance on any extrinsic evidence is improper."
This leaves the trial judge in an unenviable position of determining when
extrinsic evidence can be used. On the one hand, Markman I, as well as the
Supreme Court, states that judges may consult extrinsic evidence to
understand the terms and concepts of a patent claim. On the other hand,
Vitronics indicates that if the meaning of a word in a claim could be derived
from the specification, use of extrinsic evidence is improper. Recognizing
the supremacy of the Supreme Court's view, perhaps Vitronics should be
interpreted to mean that only generically related extrinsic evidence can be
accessed to understand general concepts of the patent technology. This
implies that specific extrinsic evidence directly related to the patent claim
technology would be improper.
This interpretation raises various narrow but relevant questions. Would
the propriety of using extrinsic evidence depend on whether it was sought
in reference to a word or concept in the scrutinized claim rather than a word
or concept used in the specification? Would the propriety of consulting a
dictionary depend on whether it was an unabridged English dictionary or a
technical dictionary? What if it is not clear whether the specification
adequately defines the term?
A hindsight perspective of the resulting confusion of reconciling these
perspectives was provided by Judge Rader in a separate opinion in a
subsequent case involving patent claim interpretation:
Under the guise of setting standards for claim construction,
this court instructs experienced trial judges that they may
use experts to understand, but not to interpret, the claim
terms. As a matter of logic, this instruction is difficult to
grasp.... In practice, how does this court's lofty appellate
logic work? As this court acknowledges, a trial court must
often resort to experts to learn complex new
technologies. . . . What happens when that learning
influences a trial judge's interpretation of the claim terms?

U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1228, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
11Id at 1583 (emphasis added).
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Are trial judges supposed to disguise the real reasons for
their interpretation? 4
IV. SUBSEQUENT INTERPRETATION OF VITRONICS

Prior to Vitronics, it was clearly established and reiterated by the Supreme
Court in MarkmanII that judges could use experts to help them understand
patent cases.
Had Vitronics, in summarizing claim interpretation,
promulgated a new restriction on hearing extrinsic evidence? There is no
indication Vitronics attempted to signal new restrictions per se, but there is
certainly some empirical evidence that some district courts interpreted
Vitronics as such.
In Tridelta Industries v. Frymaster Corp., the district court interpreted
Vitronics as requiring courts to look "to extrinsic evidence to assist in
construing a patent claim only if the intrinsic evidence is ambiguous.""
Furthermore, the court added that it should not rely on an expert witness for
the plaintiff whenever the "testimony could be construed as expert evidence,
and thus extrinsic evidence." 6 This is an unsatisfying answer to Judge
Rader's question on how a trial judge should use experts to understand, but
not to interpret patent claims.
A more extreme position of excluding extrinsic evidence based on
Vitronics was taken in Rohm and Haas Co. v. Lonza Inc.37 The district court
stated "having reviewed the intrinsic evidence, it appears to be
unnecessary-and insupportable-togo beyond the proffered record.""8 The
court denied the defendants' requests for discovery of extrinsic evidence at
the Markman hearing.39 Perhaps this judge was uncertain about how to use
the evidence to understand the patent while avoiding its use in interpreting
the patent claim. If so, the court may have erred on the side of caution by
excluding the extrinsic evidence completely.
These two district courts interpreted Vitronics as a limitation on
considering extrinsic evidence, one that discourages, if not completely shuns,

Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1474-75.
6 F. Supp.2d at 694 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (emphasis added).
Id at 695.
s 997 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Pa. 1998), vacated, 42 F. Supp.2d 509 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
3. Id at 638 (emphasis added).
" Id at 638 n.2.
"
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its usage. This impact of Vitronics was recognized and criticized by Judge

Rader as being too dogmatic in its guidance on extrinsic evidence:
In Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic,Inc. this court gave trial

courts detailed guidance to avoid expert testimony in claim
construction,ultimatelycondemningrelianceon such testimony
as 'rarely, ifever," proper. This appellate perspective
discounted the relevance and helpfulness of testimony from
experts skilled in the art to determine the meaning of

claims. 4°
Practitioners, as well, have commented that Vitronics directs district courts
away from utilizing experts "so long as the court thinks that the patent
documents are clear."41
Ironically, one does not have to look beyond Vitronics itself to find the
incongruity in its view of extrinsic evidence. A footnote indicates that:
Although technical treatises and dictionaries fall within the
category of extrinsic evidence, as they do not form a part of
an integrated patent document, they are worthy of special
note. Judges arefree to consult such resourcesat any time in
order to better understand the underlying technology and
may also rely on dictionary definitions when construing
claim terms, so long as the dictionary definition does not
contradict any definition found in or ascertained by a
reading of the patent documents.42
Vitronics clearly indicates treatises, as a form of extrinsic evidence, may be
consulted by a judge at any time in order to better understand the
technology. It follows then, that a judge could consult with the author of
the technical treatise at any time as well. After all, if written communication
with an expert is allowed, verbal communication with the same expert

' Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298,1314,51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161,11721173 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (emphasis added).
41 James B. Altman et al., The Law' of Patent Claim Inerpretation: The Revolution Isn't Finished,8

FED. CiRcurr B.J. 93, 103 (1998).
42 Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584 n.6 (emphasis added).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol8/iss1/5

8

Koster: Extrinsic Evidence in Patent Claim Interpretation: Understanding

2000]

EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IN PA TENT CLAIMS

should be allowed as well. Assuming the author is an expert with respect to
the litigated patent technology and the judge can consult with the expert at
any time, then this conclusion cannot be easily squared with the statements
in Vitronics43 indicating that experts can only be consulted if the intrinsic
evidence is ambiguous. As previously mentioned, this places the judge in the
difficult position of using nebulous guidelines to determine when it is
appropriate to use extrinsic evidence. As exemplified by previous cases,
district courts may err on the conservative side by excluding evidence that
may facilitate claim interpretation.
V. THE INTRINsIC/ExTRINSIC DEMARCATION LINE
The preceding demonstrates some question as to when extrinsic evidence
may be consulted and that some evidence, such as dictionaries and treatises,
cannot be easily classified as extrinsic or intrinsic on initial consideration.
This latter point could be viewed as whether the intrinsic/extrinsic dividing
line is a bright or fuzzy line. However, the question of whether there is any
demarcation line at all between intrinsic and extrinsic evidence is raised by

J.T Eaton & Co. v. Atlantic Paste & Glue Co."" This case raises questions
about the segregation of intrinsic/extrinsic evidence and demonstrates why
extrinsic evidence should be liberally accepted by the courts even if intrinsic
evidence is sufficient for interpreting the claim.
Eaton built the proverbial better mousetrap and sought to patent it. The
mousetrap consisted of a circular dish container with a layer of adhesive that
the mouse becomes stuck to once it steps on the adhesive. Prior to the
invention, glue-based mousetraps required the user to prepare the trap on
site, since the adhesive could not withstand shipping at high temperatures.
Eaton's innovation allowed the adhesive to be shipped without any sagging

43 To add to the confusion, some district courts indicate that technical treatises and dictionaries can
only be considered if the intrinsic evidence is ambiguous. See Rohm and Haas Co. v. Lonza Inc., 997 F.
Supp. 635,638 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (stating that if intrinsic analysis resolves ambiguity, it would be improper
to resort to extrinsic evidence such as expert testimony, dictionaries, or learned treatises); Stairmaster
Sports/Medical Products, Inc. v. Groupe Procycle, Inc., No. Civ.A. 97-396 MMS, 1998 WL 290296, at *3
(D. Del. May 20, 1998) (stating that if the meaning of the patent is still ambiguous, the court may then
consider extrinsic evidence).
106 F.3d 1563, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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or flowing. This was reflected in a claim limitation requiring the adhesive
45
to have "a plastic flow temperature above 120'F."
During patent prosecution, Eaton provided several test protocols with the
results relating to the adhesive plastic flow properties since there was no
standard industry definition. The tests involved measuring the sag or flow
of the adhesive in vertical and inverted horizontal positions under various
temperatures and for various time periods. The patent examiner found
adhesive existing in prior art that anticipated Eaton's claims and requested
tests conducted on the prior art adhesive to overcome an "obviousness"
rejection." Subsequently, a separate company, Hampton Chemical, sought
to invalidate Eaton's patent as obvious in light of previous patents and
products. Hampton Chemical requested that the Patent Office reexamine
the patent and also employ an expert to test the prior art for the "120'F
plastic flow" limitation. Meanwhile, Eaton employed a separate expert to
test the prior art adhesive in an attempt to show that it did not meet the
limitation.' Furthermore, Atlantic Paste & Glue had conducted their own
tests of the "120'F plastic flow" limitation.48
As is evident, numerous tests were conducted not only by the parties
involved in the suit, but also by others not involved in the suit (namely
Hampton Chemical). Such test results and expert testimony are typical of
the extrinsic evidence considered by a court in a Markman hearing.49 In this
case, however, the evidence was included as part of the patent prosecution
history and was therefore categorized as intrinsic evidence. As indicated in
Vitronics, intrinsic evidence may be considered by the district court in claim
interpretation.'
During the trial, the judge allowed the parties to present additional expert
testimony and test results with respect to claim interpretation. However, the
district judge could have excluded such extrinsic evidence in construing the
patent claim and relied solely on the intrinsic evidence. Indeed, under
Vitronics, if the judge could interpret the claim based on the intrinsic
evidence alone, then the extrinsic evidence should not have been

'

Idat 1565.
35 U.S.C. S 102 (1984).
Eaton, 106 F.3d at 1569.

41 Markman I, 52

F.3d at 981.
' Varonics, 90 F.3d at 1582.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol8/iss1/5

10

Koster: Extrinsic Evidence in Patent Claim Interpretation: Understanding

2000]

EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IN PA TENT CLAIMS

considered."1 Although this did not happen, such conjecture is not
outlandish given the previously mentioned examples of Rohm andHaas.and

Tridelta Industries.
This example highlights the potential arbitrariness of excluding evidence
simply because it falls on one side or the other of the intrinsic/extrinsic
dividing line. In this case, Hampton Chemical was not involved in the
lawsuit, but had an interest in the outcome of the suit and was able to
introduce their test results into the official record by requesting
reexamination. However, aside from the prosecution history, Hampton
Chemical would not be able to interject such data into the trial record of
which they were not a party. Under Vitronic's dicta, even parties to the
patent infringement trail are not assured of being able to introduce their test
results; Vitronics would only allow it to be considered if the intrinsic
evidence was insufficient. Furthermore, information contained in the
prosecution history is available for review on appeal, but extrinsic evidence
excluded at trial is not available. These scenarios demonstrate why extrinsic
evidence should generally be freely admitted by the trial court, if only to be
discounted and made available in the record for consideration on appeal. A
party in a trial should be assured they can enter extrinsic evidence to counter
third party "extrinsic" evidence converted into intrinsic evidence by virtue
of being incorporated into the prosecution history.
The result inJ. T Eaton & Company was that the Federal Circuit examined
the tests and proffered an interpretation of the plastic flow test. Its
interpretation was based on a test contained in the record that "no party
advocated throughout the protracted history of this patent." 2 That the
Federal Circuit can overrule a lower court's claim interpretation is not
surprising, but its interpretation differed from that used by the patent
examiner, the Board of Appeals, and two federal judges. The Federal Circuit
then held Eaton to the new interpretation of "120*F plastic flow" and ruled
on the case. This result was criticized as unfair in Judge Rader's strong
dissent:
This court decides this issue against Eaton on the basis of a
failure of proof-that is, Eaton's failure to prove

51 Id.
52 106 F.3d 1563, 1572 (Rader, J., dissenting). The patent was prosecuted for eight years in the Patent
Office and litigated in district court for another twelve years.
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infringement under a claim meaning no one had ever
[T]his
imagined before this court's pronouncement ....
court might at least have afforded Eaton an opportunity to
present evidence of infringement under this panel's novel
claim construction. Accordingly, even if I could accept the
court's claim meaning, I would remand the case for further
proceedings. 3
Because Eaton had included their prior test results in the prosecution
history, the results were available for consideration by the Federal Circuit.
Eaton could not have reasonably anticipated that a different claim
interpretation would be used at appeal, and even if Eaton had anticipated
this, they could not alter the record examined by the appeals court. In
retrospect, it is hard to find where Eaton could have corrected its mistake.
VI. THE "TOUCHSTONE" FUNCTION OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE

If the circumstances allow the court to clearly identify a rational line
dividing extrinsic and intrinsic evidence, then Vitronics indicates that
excluding extrinsic evidence at trial is proper if the judge is able to interpret
the claim using intrinsic evidence. This leads to the "bootstrap" problem
Given at least two competing
when excluding extrinsic evidence.
interpretations based on the intrinsic evidence, how can the judge be certain
that his interpretation is correct without considering extrinsic evidence? In
other words, how does the judge know when the intrinsic evidence is so
clear in supporting a given claim interpretation that examining extrinsic
evidence is of no value? If the judge has any doubt concerning the claim
interpretation supported by the intrinsic evidence, consulting extrinsic
evidence would serve as a touchstone, validating the conclusion.
This "touchstone" function springs from the same rationale that requires
the judge to examine the specification in conjunction with the claim.
Because the "description may act as a sort of dictionary, which explains the
invention and may define terms used in the claims,"' consulting the
specification allows validation of a meaning derived from the claim. While
intrinsic evidence in the specification may lend weight to a given claim
" ld. at 1577.
54

Markman 1,52 F.3d at 979.
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interpretation, it may not be dispositive. This is when consulting extrinsic
evidence may be useful.
However, this benefit is lost if extrinsic evidence is excluded by the trial
judge. Such exclusion further prevents the appellate court from using it to
validate the trial court's interpretation. Perhaps this problem was what
Judges Newman and Mayer of the Federal Circuit had in mind when they
stated that "[t]he Federal Circuit's ruling that extrinsic evidence must be
restricted unless there is a facial ambiguity in the meaning of the claim is an
unnecessary restraint on potentially useful evidence.""5
VII. TEST FOR EXCLUDING EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
Two examples illustrate different circumstances for when consulting
extrinsic evidence would be useful and provide a test for determining when
to seek out extrinsic evidence. The first example, York Products Inc. v.
Central TractorFarm & Family Center, 6 is a case where extrinsic evidence
was largely not used, nor would its consideration have been useful. The case
involved a patent for a plastic liner for a pick-up truck bed that incorporated
ridges in the side wall construction. The ridges allowed boards to be inserted
across the truck bed for securing loads carried in the pickup bed. The claim
indicated that the ridges must extend a "substantial part of the entire height
[of the side wall]." 7 The infringement suit focused on how high the ridges
were required to extend up the side wall. The court noted that nothing in
the specification imparted a unique meaning to the term "substantial";
therefore, the ordinary meaning of the word should be used." The court
determined the meaning of the term "substantial" with the aid of an English
dictionary. However, the court largely validated the interpretation using
intrinsic evidence, the drawings contained in the specification.
Admittedly, it is difficult for a trial judge to know when a claim
interpretation is sufficiently supported by the intrinsic evidence and when
consideration of extrinsic evidence would be useful and should be sought
out. In this case, aside from consulting a dictionary, no consideration of
extrinsic evidence was provided, mentioned, or offered. It is hard to imagine

s Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1480 (concurring).
s 99 F.3d 1568, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1619 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
57 Id at 1572.
- Id at 1573.
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how expert testimony, for example, would affect the interpretation and
benefit the court.
However, other cases are not so obvious and the question remains: how
does a judge know when claim interpretation would benefit from examining
extrinsic evidence? To answer this question, it should be noted that York
Products did not involve any complicated technology, nor was the term
"substantial" amenable to clarification by those skilled in the art. No special
education or expertise was required 9 to understand the concept, claim, or
word. Furthermore, no indication was mentioned of extrinsic evidence
offered by the parties to assist the judge in claim interpretation. With these
aspects all being in accordance with the ordinary nature of the term in
question, the judge could be reasonably assured that seeking further extrinsic
evidence would not enhance the quality of claim interpretation.
Voice Technologies Group,Inc. v. VMC Systems, Inc.' is an example where
the judge should have considered extrinsic evidence. This case uniquely
demonstrates a situation where some of the patentee's extrinsic evidence was
"discarded" by the judge as irrelevant to the patent interpretation.61
Fortunately for the patentee, the court then added the extrinsic evidence to
the record when it granted summary judgment of non-infringement, thus
preserving the evidence for consideration on appeal.62 On appeal, the
holding was reversed in part due to the very "discarded" extrinsic evidence
that conclusively showed that the trial court's claim interpretation was
incorrect. 63
The patentee, VMC Systems, claimed patent infringement from Voice
Technologies Group's telecommunications product: a Private Branch
Exchange (PBX) incorporating an adjunct processor for providing enhanced
service capabilities. Faced with pre-trial motions and cross-motions for
summary judgment, the district court conducted a Markman hearing
considering the extrinsic evidence for claim interpretation.' At issue was the
meaning of the claim elements "telephone emulation" and "talk path." The
district court ruled "that the meaning of 'telephone emulation' was unclear
as used in the specification" and "the term should be defined as it would be
Except that beyond contained in a simple dictionary.
164 F.3d 605.
61itat 611.
"

62

I

61Id2 at 616.
" Id at 611.
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understood by a person of skill in the field of the invention."" Having
determined the intrinsic evidence was insufficient for claim interpretation,
the court turned to extrinsic evidence.
Accordingly, the court entertained statements from the executive vice
president of Voice Technologies and its expert witness, while VMS offered
testimony of its president and product manager, deposition of the two coinventors, and a videotape demonstrating the product's operation. Voice
Technologies objected to the videotape as evidence, and the district court
initially excluded it, as well as the inventors' testimony.6 The district court
interpreted the Federal Circuit's Markman ruling as rendering inventor
testimony irrelevant. The district court stated:
[Voice Technologies] argues that the declaration, the video
demonstration, and the transcript are all irrelevant under
Markman, as a subjective, unreliable, "after the fact" attempt
to construe a claim by the inventor. This Court agrees.
The declaration does not set forth any qualifications of Mr.
Oshima [a co-inventor of the patent] which would allow it
to be read as a declaration of an expert or one "skilled in the
art."

67

This result is a perverse reversal of common sense. The president, who
presumably is not engaged in the day-to-day design of communication
systems, is deemed to be an expert in the area of PBX design. Perhaps this
is so, but nothing is mentioned of any qualifications other than his title. The
inventor, who is intimately familiar with the technology and engaged in the
design of such systems on a daily basis, is not deemed to be an expert in the
field of PBX design.
Perhaps the district court was influenced by a passage from Markman I
which stated that the inventor's testimony "on the proper construction of
the claims is entitled to no deference."" However, a careful reading of
Markman I shows the inventor's testimony may be considered to enhance
the court's understanding of the patent and related technology, but "not for

65 Voice Techs., 164 F.3d at 611.
66 Id
67 Id

6'Markman

1,52 F.3d at 983.
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the purpose of varying or contradicting the terms of the claims."69 The
Federal Circuit directly addressed this confusion:
We express concern that this court's Markman decision may
have led the district court to exclude the Oshima declaration
and video demonstration during claim construction.
Although in Markman this court stated that "the subjective
intent of the inventor when he used a particular term is of
little or no probative weight in determining the scope of a
claim," this statement does not disqualify the inventor as a
witness, or overrule the large body of precedent that
recognizes the value of the inventor's testimony ...
Markman did not hold that the inventor can not explain the
technology and what was invented and claimed; the Federal
Circuit held only that the inventor can not by later
testimony change the invention and the claims from their
meaning at the time the patent was drafted and granted. 0
As common sense dictates, the Federal Circuit recognized that the inventor
is an expert in his field, and, if testimony from one skilled in the field is
allowed, the inventor should be allowed to testify about the invention. It
can be presumed the judge will not blindly follow such testimony if it
contradicts the other evidence or attempts to enlarge or modify claims."1
Using the previously defined criteria for ascertaining when extrinsic
evidence should be considered, the first question to ask is whether
complicated technology is involved, such that special education or expertise
would facilitate understanding its concepts. Obviously, adjunct-to-PBX
system communication is considered high technology. In addition, judges
are not normally skilled in this art. Consequently, testimony of one with
industry expertise or formal engineering education would benefit the judge
in understanding the technology. Extrinsic evidence was offered and the
judge accepted some of the extrinsic evidence in forming his interpretation

Id. at 981.
Voice Tedhs., 164 F.3d at 615 (citations omitted).
" The same point has been stated using the oft quoted phrase "an inventor may not be heard to
proffer an interpretation that would... treat the claim as a 'nose of wax.'" Senmed, Inc. v. Richard-Allan
Medical Indus. Inc., 888 F.2d 815, 819 n.8, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1508, 1512 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
'o
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but discarded other portions offered by the patentee. Indeed, the district
court "criticized the evidence submitted by VMC as 'add[ing] to the
confusion over the issue of voice or talk path.' "
In this instance, the Federal Circuit indicated that the inventor's
testimony was critical to claim interpretation and supported reversal of the
lower court. The Federal Circuit stated that "[t]he declaration of Oshima
[the co-inventor] exposes ambiguities in the Orr and Fritzinger analyses
[witnesses for Voice Technologies], and their distortion of the . . .
invention.""3 The Federal Circuit also added that the videocassette
demonstrated the flaws in Voice Technologies arguments as well. Had the
district court given greater consideration to extrinsic evidence, it might have
detected its error and discovered the specification had clearly defined the
ambiguous term. While discarding evidence inconsistent with a conclusion
is one way for a district court to build a record supporting that conclusion,
judicial integrity should incorporate the evidence and state the reasons why
it is not persuasive or relevant to a given claim interpretation.
While extrinsic evidence is not always necessary to derive the proper
claim interpretation, it may facilitate interpretation and function as a
touchstone to test the interpretation. The danger of including extrinsic
evidence in the trial record is small. If extrinsic evidence does not support
the interpretation, the trial court can indicate its reasons why the evidence
was not relevant, and the Federal Circuit can affirm or reverse on appeal.
Fortunately, the "excluded" evidence in this case was eventually included in
the record allowing consideration by the Federal Circuit. Had it been
excluded, this may have jeopardized the quality of the Federal Circuit's
decision.
VIII. A MODERATING VIEW OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE

The benefit of considering extrinsic evidence even when the intrinsic
evidence is thought to be unambiguous is illustrated in the recent Federal
Circuit ruling Pitney Bowes Inc. v. Hewlett-PackardCo. 4 The Federal Circuit
also used this case to signal to the district courts to take a moderating view

m Voice Tecbs., 164 F.3d at 611.
,'Id.at615.
14

182 F.3d 1298.
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of the use of extrinsic evidence and recognize that "no strict, uniform rules
can anticipate every variable in assessing complex technical evidence.""5
Pitney Bowes' patent pertained to an improvement in laser printing
technology. Laser printers operate by directing a laser beam onto a
photoreceptive drum. The drum is electrically charged, and at each point
where the laser beam is directed, the electrical charge on the drum dissipates.
Subsequently, the drum passes over toner material that attaches itself to the
discharged areas on the drum. The drum then transfers the toner to the
paper where the toner is fused onto the paper at high temperature. The
drum is wiped clean and recharged to repeat the process. The laser beam is
very tiny, resulting in a correspondingly tiny discharge dot on the drum,
which in turn results in a tiny dot on the paper. Hundreds of dots are used
to compose a single character, and as the dots only approximate the letter's
shape, imperfections exist in the lines or edges around the printed letter.
These jagged edges are known in the industry as "jaggies." The Pitney Bowes
patent was directed to enhancing print quality by reducing the jaggies using
varying sized dots to smooth out the edges. The patent included several
methods of varying the toner dot size by altering the laser beam striking the
photoreceptive drum. The first method varied the intensity of the laser
beam and the second method varied the duration that the laser beam was
directed onto the photoreceptor. 6
Consequently, different size discharge spots can be produced on the
photoreceptor drum by a single laser beam by changing its intensity or
duration. In describing this process, Pitney Bowes indicated the laser beam
creates a spot of light on the drum with the resulting electrostatic discharge
area described as a spot. The confusion becomes apparent when interpreting
the following claims using the word "spot":
1. A method of producing on a photoreceptor an image of
generated shapes made up of spots, comprising:
directing a plurality of beams of light towards a
photoreceptor, each beam of light generating a spot on the
photoreceptor and controlling a parameter of the light
beams to produce spots of different sizes whereby the

Id at 1314 (additional views of Rader & Plager, JJ).
"Additional methods described in the patent are not relevant to the immediate discussion.
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appearance of smoothed edges are given to the generated
shapes.
2. The method of claim 1 wherein the parameter
controlled is light beam intensity.
3. Apparatus for producing on a photoreceptor an image
of generated shapes made up of spots, comprising:
means for directing a plurality of beams of light toward a
photoreceptor to generating [sic] a plurality of spots on the
photoreceptor and means for generating spotsofdifferentsizes
whereby the appearance of smoothed edges are given to the
generated shapes.'
At issue in the district court was the interpretation of the word "spot" in the
phrase "to produce spots of different sizes." Are different size laser beam
spots produced? Or are different size electrostatic discharge spots on the
drum produced? The first interpretation describes the means used to
produce the end, and the second interpretation is the end itself. Either
interpretation results in varied spots of toner on the paper serving to reduce
the jaggies.
Hewlett-Packard's printer varied the duration of the laser beam (the beam
itself being a constant size) in order to vary the size of the discharge spot.
Hewlett-Packard argued that "spots of different sizes" in the claims referred
to a varying spot of light. It supported this interpretation by pointing to the
additional specificity in the second claim that varies the intensity of the light.
Hewlett-Packard inferred that varying the intensity of the laser beam
produced a varying size light beam. Thus, it argued "spot of different sizes"
referred to light spots. Since Hewlett-Packard's product varied the duration,
not the size of the light beam, such an interpretation would result in the
judge granting Hewlett-Packard's motion for summary judgment for noninfringement. However, if the interpretation is that the varying spot
referred to the discharge spot on the drum, then Hewlett-Packard's printer,
which varied the duration of the laser beam, would produce this result. This
would lead to granting Pitney Bowes' motion for summary judgment for
infringement. The outcome was determined by which interpretation of
"spot" the judge selected.

" Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1302 (emphasis added).
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Using the claim interpretation procedure in Vitronics, the court's first
step was to analyze the claims themselves. The district court found the claim
language supported either interpretation. Since "[c]laims must be read in
view of the specification, of which they are a part,""8 the district court
proceeded to examine the specification. There were forty-four instances of
"spot" in the specification and Pitney Bowes argued the first forty-two
referred to the spot created by the laser beam while the last two instances
referred to the discharge spot. The district court disagreed with this
inconsistent interpretation of "spot" and found that all uses of "spot" referred
to a laser beam light. "[T]he district court reasoned that 'since inventors
"must use words in the same way in the claims and in the specification," it
is logical to conclude that the word spot also means a light spot when used
in the claims .... "179
Having selected an interpretation with cogent support from the
specification, the district court examined the remaining intrinsic evidence,
the prosecution history, and noted that the examiner amended the title so
that "spot" was changed to "light spot." The district court stated that this
furthered the interpretation as meaning "light spot" since the patent
"'examiner was in the best position to fully understand the nature of the
invention and the meaning of the terms used in the patent.' "so
As stated in Vitronics, "[i]n most situations, an analysis of the intrinsic
evidence alone will resolve any ambiguity in a disputed claim term. In such
circumstances, it is improper to rely on extrinsic evidence.""' Since there was
no genuine ambiguity of the meaning of "spot" after examination of the
intrinsic evidence, a district court relying on Vitronics should not have
considered any extrinsic evidence regarding claim interpretation.
However, the district court did consider extrinsic evidence in the form of
expert witnesses' affidavits, supplemental affidavits, and rebuttal affidavits.
To no surprise, the extrinsic evidence consisted of confficting expert
testimony concerning measuring the size of a light spot. Hewlett-Packard's

' Markman 1,52 F.3d at 979 (quoting Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397, 155
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 697,702 (Ct. CI. 1967)); Bates v. Coe, 98 U.S. 31, 38-39 (1878); Winans v. Denmead, 56
U.S. (15 How.) 330, 338 (1853).
'9 Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 13 10 (quoting Fonar Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 821 F.2d 627, 632, 3
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1109, 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
1 Id. at 1312. This surprising statement implies the court is to give deference to the patent examiner.
81 Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583 (quoting Pall, 66 F.3d at 1216); Hormone Research Found., Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1562, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1039, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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expert witness indicated that in digital printing the "spot" size of light is
defined by the area of the light spot exceeding a certain threshold intensity. 2
Thus, Pitney Bowes' second claim reference to varying the intensity would
result in the varying light spot size of the other claims. Pitney Bowes' expert
testified that in optics, the size of a laser beam spot does not increase with
intensity and that the varying size spot was the discharge spot. 3
On appeal, Pitney Bowes claimed the court improperly relied on extrinsic
evidence. 4 Even though the trial court had determined that the intrinsic
evidence supported its conclusion that "spot" referred to a 'light spot,' the
trial court felt obligated to consider extrinsic evidence." This situation
certainly required special training and education to understand. Expertise of
those skilled in the art would benefit the trial court as both parties offered
such expert testimony for consideration. Based on this criteria, the district
court properly considered the extrinsic evidence.
X. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S RESPONSE
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court's findings, ruling that
"spots of differing sizes" refers to discharge spots created on the drum. 6
Although the district court followed the claim interpretation procedure
spelled out in Vitronics, Judge Rader noted that "Vitronics offers good
counsel when it urges trial judges to focus on the patent document-notably
the claims themselves-to ascertain the scope of patent coverage. This
appellate court, however, should refrain from dictating a claim interpretation
process that excludes reliable expert testimony."87
On appeal, the first step was to review the claim itself.8 Although the use
of "spot" appeared ambiguous, the Federal Circuit indicated that a careful
reading led to the proper interpretation of "spot."89 The key was to examine
the preamble where the first usage of "spot" occurs. Quite often, the
preamble adds little to the substance of the claim. But when "the [claim]

Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1307.
83

Id

94Id

"

i at 1309.

" Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1300.
v Id at 1314 (Radar, J., additional views).
" Id at 1304.
Id at 1305.
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preamble is 'necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality' to the claim...,"
then the claim preamble should be construed as if in the balance of the
claim. 90 Here, the preamble refers to a method or apparatus for "producing
on a photoreceptor an image of generated shapes made up of spots .... " 91
Since the images of generated shapes are the characters on the photoreceptor
drum, these shapes must be the discharge areas. As the shapes are made up
of spots, the "spots" must be the discharge spots on the photoreceptor drum.
The "spots" cannot be beams of light, since the laser beam creates discrete
separate dots and cannot by itself be the generated shapes. Recall that the
claim involved "an image of generated shapes made up of spots ... . 92
Furthermore, since the spots of varying sizes have the appearance of
smooth edges, this can only refer to the discharge spots, since the laser beam
shape is a constant dot. This first instance of "spots," as used in the
preamble, fixes the subsequent meanings of "spot" employed in the claim and
results in consistent usage of the word throughout the claim.
Given that an interpretation is derived from the claims themselves, the
Federal Circuit next examined the specification to support the meaning of
"spot." 9 Regarding the forty-four uses of "spot" in the specification, the
Federal Circuit noted while consistency is a general rule, previous cases 4
have recognized various meanings attributable to a same word or phrase in
a claim. 9 The Federal Circuit noted that there were distinct meanings
attached to the use of "spot" in the specification and that this should put the
reader on notice of the different uses of the word.
The third form of intrinsic evidence relied on by the district court was
the prosecution history, in which the title was amended during prosecution.
The court noted the "near irrelevancy of the patent title to claim
construction,"' and concluded that the district court accorded too much
weight to the change in title. 97 The main purpose of the title is to assist in

IeIat 1306 (quoting Kropa v. Robie, 187 F.2d 150,152,88 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 478,481 (CCPA 1951)).

Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1302 (emphasis added).
9

Id. at 1302.

SId. at 1310.

"See Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found., Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cix.
1994) (noting four possible definitions of the phrase "human tissue plasminogen activator' in a claim).
" Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1310.
'6 Id at 1312.
' Id The Court noted only one instance of case law in which the patent title was relevant to claim
construction: Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553,35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
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indexing and searching at the Patent Office, not to "demarcate the precise
boundaries of the claimed invention. " "
During this reinterpretation of the claim using intrinsic evidence, the
Federal Circuit neither recast any of its previous characterizations on claim
interpretation, nor does it identify any blatant misapplications by the district
court of intrinsic claim interpretation procedures.
However, the same cannot be said with respect to the Federal Circuit's
comments on extrinsic evidence, namely the district court's perspective of
Vitronics and use of extrinsic evidence." It could have been expected that the
Federal Circuit would chastise the district court for considering extrinsic
evidence when it was not necessary. Instead the Federal Circuit states,
"under Vitronics, it is entirely appropriate, perhaps even preferable, for a
court to consult trustworthy extrinsic evidence to ensure that the claim
construction it is tending to from the patent file is not inconsistent with
clearly expressed, plainly apposite, and widely held understandings in the
pertinent technical field."" ° This is the first indication in the opinion that the
Federal Circuit is "reinterpreting" Vitronics 1" The Federal Circuit says
"Vitronics does not prohibit courts from examining extrinsic evidence, even
when the patent document is itself clear,""0 2 and " Vitronics does not set forth
any rules regarding the admissibility of expert testimony into evidence." 3
The Federal Circuit's view of Vitronics is that as long as the court does not
rely on extrinsic evidence to contradict the intrinsic evidence, its use is
proper.
The tone of the analysis indicates a shift from the previous narrow
consideration of extrinsic evidence, and this perspective is confirmed by
Judge Rader, who has been outspoken since Markman on the benefits of
extrinsic evidence.
Today, this court takes the opportunity to restate the role of
expert testimony. I applaud this court's effort to express
more trust in the "broad latitude" and "considerable leeway"
afforded presiding trial judges in assessing the reliability of

"

Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1312.
IA at 1308 n.2.
SId at 1309.

t The opinion references Vitronics at least a half dozen times in clarifying what Vitronics stated.
102 Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1308 (emphasis added).
£0I l
(emphasis added).
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expert testimony.... In this case, however, this court holds
that the trial court did not err by improper reliance on
expert testimony. Rather, the trial court erred in placing
too much reliance upon the written description when the
claim language admitted of a broader reading. The resulting
construction of the claims thus contained limitations
improperly imported from the written description."
Judge Rader recognizes that sole reliance on intrinsic evidence may render
a plausible interpretation, but not one that may be borne by the extrinsic
evidence.
While the extrinsic evidence consisted of two conflicting expert witnesses,
what would have happened if there was only one; one that supported the
Federal Circuit's finding of the meaning of "spot"? Should not the trial court
at least have considered it to confirm the validity of its determination?
Certainly, it is appropriate to use the specification or patent prosecution
history to confirm the validity of a claim interpretation. Why not allow
extrinsic evidence to do the same? Pitney Bowes sends the message that it is
now acceptable for trial courts to consider extrinsic evidence.
X. HOW DID TRIAL COURTS COME TO INTERPRET Vitronics?
By the Federal Circuit's own perspective, the trial courts have incorrectly
interpreted Vitronics. However, some of the Federal Circuit's own
statements seem to indicate that the fault is not entirely with the trial
courts.1' What can explain this apparent confusion?
One potential explanation requires examining the judicial circumstances
of the rulings. In 1995, the Federal Circuit promulgated fairly welldeveloped guidelines in Markman I in an en banc ruling. That ruling was
affirmed in 1996 by the Supreme Court in Markman II, but Markman II
largely focused on claim interpretation as a matter of law. It did not clarify
the line between using extrinsic evidence to educate the judge on technology
and allowing extrinsic evidence to influence claim interpretation. This was

Id at 1315 (citations omitted).
t"Compare supra note 33 with supra note 101 (indicating that use of extrinsic evidence is improper
when the intrinsic evidence is dear, but also that no rules prohibiting its use are set forth).
"0
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the fine line described previously in Tridelta, in which testimony of an
expert was construed as extrinsic evidence not to be relied on.
Arguably, the line was moved shortly thereafter to discourage
consideration of extrinsic evidence, when, in July 1996, a the Federal Circuit
panel consisting of Judges Michel, Lourie, and Friedman issued the Vitronics
decision. Indication of diverging views in the Federal Circuit on the use of
extrinsic evidence became evident in 1997 in EastmanKodak Co. v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co.1" This case involved determination of a temperature in
the process of making certain granules. The trial court found that the
intrinsic evidence was not dispositive and thus entertained expert testimony.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit panel consisted of Judges Lourie, Mayer, and
Rader. Judges Mayer and Rader indicated that if the meaning is clear from
intrinsic evidence, consideration of extrinsic evidence should be limited.
However, they added:
As a general rule, the construing court interprets words in a
claim as one of skill in the art at the time of invention would
understand them. . . . Therefore, the testimony of one
skilled in the art about the meaning of claim terms at the
time of the invention will almost always qualify as relevant
evidence. 10
However, Judge Lourie dissented, stating "[t]he claim is clear on its face,
when read in light of the specification"-the majority "[has] simply been
mislead concerning what the specification clearly states and means.""'8 Judge
Lourie adds that "I believe that there is no need to resort to extrinsic
evidence to resolve an ambiguity in the claim,""° but does not indicate how
a judge is to know when there is no need. Obviously, the majority had a
different perspective and saw the need to resort to extrinsic evidence.
Judge Lourie was on the Vitronics majority and maintained this view of
the use of extrinsic evidence in Pitney Bowes as well. Thus, the diverging
views between Federal Circuit judges as manifested in their rulings is

'* 114 F.3d 1547,42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
"7 Id at 1555.
11 Id. at 1561-62.
'" i at 1563.
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partially responsible for the diverging views of the lower courts regarding
extrinsic evidence.
Another hypothesis for the diverging perspective of the district courts is
offered, but it represents a non-scholarly answer to an otherwise scholarly
question. First, consider that district courts hear far fewer patent cases than
the Federal Circuit and some district courts, by virtue of their location, may
rarely adjudicate patent cases. In the aftermath of Markman II, subsequent
district court cases on claim interpretation would surely research this area
anew given the significant developments in patent claim interpretation. It
is not surprising a judicial clerk researching the current status of claim
interpretation would enlist an on-line service such as Westlaw. A common
method of research would be to search the West Key Numbers on the topic,
specifically "291k159" defining extrinsic evidence with respect to
"construction and operation of letters patent." As it happens, Vitronics is
particularly rich in headnotes pertaining to extrinsic evidence, containing
twelve. A search on this key number will return eight of the headnotes in
Vitronics,10 more than any other case afterMarkmanI. Although examining
headnotes is not a suitable manner by itself to describe legal principles on a
topic, it does provide some guidance on the issue. However, headnotes are
often a sentence or two extracted or summarized from the case and lack the
context from which they are taken.
Evidence these headnotes formed the basis of the district court's view on
extrinsic evidence can be found in Rohm and Haas which refused
consideration of extrinsic evidence. The discussion in that case regarding
Markman hearings and extrinsic evidence quoted six passages from previous
cases to set forth the case law on the topic. Five of these were from Vitronics
and one fromMarkman I. Each quoted passage was the whole or part of the
West headnote from the respective cases. While further references were
made to the cases, the quoted passages were all headnotes. This seems to
indicate the court's reliance on headnotes to ascertain the treatment of
extrinsic evidence. The Vitronics' headnotes are included in Appendix I, and
the headnotes quoted in Rohm and Haasare indicated as well. A reading of
just these headnotes leaves a decidedly skewed perspective that extrinsic
evidence is to be used only with caution and that such consideration is

"' Search performed on October 25, 1999.
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improper if claim interpretation can be ascertained without extrinsic
evidence.
Searches performed for extrinsic evidence usage return the headnotes
from the most recent cases. If done after Pitney Bowes, three headnotes will
be returned from that case. A reading of these three provides a decidedly
more moderate perspective on extrinsic evidence."' Hopefully, a better
understanding of the use of extrinsic evidence will occur as the legal
community becomes aware of these recent cases.
XI. ROLE OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IN FUTURE CASES
So where does use of extrinsic evidence stand? If PitneyBowes influences
the courts in any way regarding extrinsic evidence, the court is likely to
affirm the judge's discretion in considering extrinsic evidence so long as it is
not relied upon to controvert a plain interpretation derived from the
intrinsic evidence. As in York Products, if claim interpretation does not
require those skilled in the art to explain aspects of the claim or complicated
technology, seeking extrinsic evidence is unlikely to be useful, but unlikely
to be found improper. If the claim can be clearly defined using intrinsic
evidence alone, then extrinsic evidence may serve as a touchstone to validate
the interpretation, but relying on extrinsic evidence to justify an
interpretation contradicting intrinsic evidence will not be sustained. For the
"hard" cases, where intrinsic evidence can equally support multiple
interpretations, using extrinsic evidence will be proper and useful. Since
opposing extrinsic evidence is frequently offered, it behooves the judge to
explain in the decision how the evidence does or does not support the court's
interpretation. Although claim interpretation is reviewed de novo,"' Federal
Circuit judges do recognize the time and effort spent by the trial judge and
do "not reverse unless we are convinced that we should."1
Finally, the discretion of the trial court in considering such extrinsic
evidence is also likely to be bolstered in light of a recent Supreme Court
decision, Kumbo Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael."4 In this case, an engineer
. These are induded in Appendix H.
' CIyor Corp., 138 F.3d 1448.
...
Mark T. Banner, Modern Tendsin IntelectualProperty,Fall 1998, (visitedJuly 1,1999) < wwwlaw.
uiuc.edu/ipls/www/mtip/mtb.html> (quoting Judge Lourie, Michel, Appelate Advocacy: OneJudge's
View, I FED. CR. BARJ. 2, at 3-4 (1991)).
t" 526 U.S. 137.
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rather than a scientist provided expert testimony, and the Court ruled that
the judge's gatekeeping functions apply not only to scientific, but all expert
evidence, including engineering experts. Although the case involved a tort
claim rather than a patent issue, the Court recognized the appropriateness of
the trial judge to determine reliability and admissibility of expert testimony.
The Court emphasized the judge is to be given broad latitude to determine
when and how expert testimony is to be credited. That this view carries
over into claim interpretation is affirmed by Judge Rader in Pitney Bowes
when he quotes Kuhmo Tire: "[t]oday this court takes the opportunity to
restate the role of expert testimony. I applaud this court's effort to express
more trust in the 'broad latitude' and 'considerable leeway' afforded
presiding trial judges in assessing the reliability of expert testimony.""1

11s

Pitney Bowue, 182 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. 537).
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APPENDIX I
VIRONCS116 WESTLAW HEADNOTES
PERTAINING TO EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
(Headnotes in capitalized text are the headnotes returned when searching for
Westlaw Key Number "291k159.")
1.

IN

MOST SITUATIONS, ANALYSIS OF INTRINSIC
EVIDENCE ALONE WILL RESOLVE ANY AMBIGUITY IN
DISPUTED

PATENT

CLAIM

TERM;

IN

SUCH

CIRCUMSTANCES, IT IS IMPROPER TO RELY ON
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE.

2.

In those cases where public record unambiguously
describes scope of patented invention, reliance on any
extrinsic evidence is improper.

3.

CLAIMS, SPECIFICATION, AND FILE HISTORY, RATHER
THAN EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE, CONSTITUTE PUBLIC
RECORD OF PATENTEE'S CLAIM, RECORD ON WHICH
PUBLIC IS ENTITLED TO RELY.

4.

EVEN IF TRIAL JUDGE PERMISSIBLY DECIDED TO HEAR
ALL POSSIBLE EVIDENCE BEFORE CONSTRUING
PATENT CLAIM, EXPERT TESTIMONY, WHICH WAS
INCONSISTENT WITH SPECIFICATION AND FILE
HISTORY, SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACCORDED NO
WEIGHT.
IN INSTANCES IN WHICH INTRINSIC EVIDENCE IS
INSUFFICIENT TO ENABLE COURT TO DETERMINE
MEANING OF CERTAIN PATENT CLAIMS, EXTRINSIC
EVIDENCE MAY ALSO PROPERLY BE RELIED ON TO
UNDERSTAND THE TECHNOLOGY AND TO CONSTRUE

5.

CLAIMS.

6.

H6

"Extrinsic evidence" is that evidence which is external
to patent and file history, such as expert testimony,

90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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inventor testimony, dictionaries, and technical treatises
and articles.
7.

EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IN GENERAL, AND EXPERT
TESTIMONY IN PARTICULAR, MAY BE USED ONLY TO
HELP COURT COME TO PROPER UNDERSTANDING OF
PATENT CLAIMS; IT MAY NOT BE USED TO VARY OR
CONTRADICT CLAIM LANGUAGE.

8.

Extrinsic evidence may not contradict import of other
parts of patent specifications.

9.

WHERE PATENT DOCUMENTS ARE UNAMBIGUOUS,
EXPERT TESTIMONY REGARDING MEANING OF CLAIM
IS ENTITLED TO NO WEIGHT.

10. As compared to expert testimony, which often only
indicates what particular expert believes patent term
means, prior art references may be more indicative of
what all those skilled in art generally believe certain
term means; reliance on such evidence is unnecessary
and improper, however, when disputed terms can be
understood from careful reading of public record.
11. TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING EXTRINSIC
EVIDENCE WHEN DETERMINING MEANING OF CLAIM
TERM "SOLDER REFLOW TEMPERATURE" IN PATENT
FOR METHOD OF REFLOW SOLDERING OF SURFACE
MOUNTED DEVICES TO PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARDS,
AND
CLEARLY
WHERE SPECIFICATION
12.

UNAMBIGUOUSLY DEFINED TERM.
PRIOR ART DOCUMENTS AND DICTIONARIES ARE TO
BE PREFERRED OVER OPINION TESTIMONY, WHETHER
BY ATTORNEY OR BY ARTISAN IN FIELD OF
TECHNOLOGY TO WHICH PATENT IS DIRECTED,
WHEN INTERPRETING PATENT CLAIM.
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PIREYBowES1 7 HEADNOTES PERTAINING TO EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
1.

2.

3.

4.

In construing patent claims, courts are not prohibited
from examining extrinsic evidence, even when the
patent document is itself clear.
It is entirely appropriate, perhaps even preferable, for
a court to consult trustworthy extrinsic evidence to
ensure that the claim construction it is tending to from
the patent file is not inconsistent with clearly expressed,
plainly apposite, and widely held understandings in the
pertinent technical field, especially with respect to
technical terms, as opposed to non-technical terms in
general usage or terms of art in the claim-drafting art,
such as "comprising."
A patent is both a technical and a legal document, and,
while a judge is well-equipped to interpret the legal
aspects of the document, he or she must also interpret
the technical aspects of the document, and indeed its
overall meaning, from the vantage point of one skilled
in the art.
In construing patent claim, district court could rely on
extrinsic evidence in discussing collateral argument,
made by patentee, that alleged infringer's proffered
construction would exclude preferred embodiment
from scope of patent, although use of extrinsic evidence
to contradict claim construction apparent from
intrinsic evidence would have been improper.
KARL KOSTER

nu 182 F.3d 1298.
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